Introduction
The late 1990s were characterized by a state of rapidly rising stock prices, lucrative stock options, IPOs, venture capital deals and exceptionally tight labor markets. The NASDAQ rose from 1,059 on January 2, 1996 to 5,049 on March 10, 2000. Remarkably, the national unemployment rate dropped below 4 percent in April 2000. The late 1990s were also characterized by a marked increase in the use of computers and the Internet by individuals and firms. Both the number of personal computers and the number of people using the Internet increased by roughly 100 million from 1996 to 2001 in the United
States (International Telecommunications Union 2005).
Silicon Valley, California played a major role in the expansion of ICTs in the 1990s. The large concentration of hi-tech industries in the corridor between San Francisco and San Jose is well known, and much emphasis was placed on the role of entrepreneurs and startups, especially in hi-tech industries and regions such as Silicon Valley in contributing to economic growth in the 1990s. The media dubbed it the "dot com" boom. There was the impression that most people were interested in becoming an entrepreneur or involved in some type of startup. question as to whether this was a period of heightened entrepreneurship or one in which the returns to working at firms were too great.
To address this limitation in the literature, a new measure of entrepreneurial activity is used to study business creation from 1996 to 2005 in Silicon Valley. Microdata from matched monthly files from the Current Population Survey (CPS) are used to estimate the rate of entrepreneurship. Although the cross-sectional CPS data are commonly used to estimate static rates of business ownership, the matched data allow for the creation of a dynamic measure of entrepreneurship that captures the rate of business formation at the individual owner level. A major advantage of these data is that all new business owners are captured, including those who own incorporated or unincorporated businesses, and those who are (Davis, et. al. 2006) . Another advantage of these data is that the analysis can focus on hi-tech industries instead of just aggregate business creation.
The large sample sizes and detailed demographic information available in the matched CPS allow for a comparison of entrepreneurship rates in Silicon Valley to the rest of the country and an empirical analysis of the determinants of entrepreneurship. 4 Drawing from the prior literature in economics and management, several important hypotheses regarding entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley are tested. First, was entrepreneurship higher in Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States in the economic expansion of the late 1990s? The rapidly growing economy may have created many opportunities for startups, but wage and salary earnings and the opportunity cost of capital were also rising rapidly during this period. Second, Silicon Valley has a highly-educated population and large concentration of immigrants, which are both associated with higher rates of entrepreneurship. Were entrepreneurship rates higher in Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States after controlling for these differences in demographic characteristics and other characteristics such as previous employment status and industrial structure? Finally, did the downturn of the early 2000s reverse an upward trend in entrepreneurship or did entrepreneurship rise in Silicon Valley? The comparison to the post-boom period may shed light on whether entrepreneurship was dampened in Silicon Valley in the late 1990s by the unusually tight labor market.
We find that entrepreneurship rates were lower in Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States during the period from January 1996 to February 2000, even after controlling for the large concentration of immigrants and a highly-educated workforce. In the post boom period, we find that entrepreneurship rates in Silicon Valley increased while the national rate stayed constant. While our results challenge the conventional wisdom about Silicon Valley in the late 1990s, we also contribute to the academic literature on entrepreneurship in economics and management. Below, we discuss how prior work has separately emphasized the role of both entrepreneurial opportunities and opportunity costs in influencing entrepreneurial activities. In this paper, we bring together these perspectives to motivate our empirical approach. We then present our results and conclusions.
Theoretical Perspectives on Entrepreneurial Opportunities
This paper begins with the observation that numerous entrepreneurial opportunities were said to have existed in Silicon Valley during the late 1990s, but we have little robust empirical evidence that these opportunities were exploited by individuals. There is a substantial academic literature in economics and management on entrepreneurial opportunities that we consider below to motivate our empirical analysis.
Prior management research has argued that entrepreneurship requires the existence and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman 2000) . While most prior research on entrepreneurship focused on individual level characteristics, scholars have recently investigated the role of available opportunities in influencing entrepreneurial activities (Eckhardt and Shane 2003) . The key question in this emerging literature is: Upon recognizing an entrepreneurial opportunity, why do some individuals exploit the opportunity while others choose not to? Shane and Venkataraman (2000:223) argue that the expected payoff from an entrepreneurial opportunity is weighed against "the opportunity cost of other alternatives".
Similarly, in the economics literature, a theoretical analysis of the choice to become a business owner has generally been based upon the relative earnings that a worker could obtain there in comparison with his or her earnings at a wage and salary job. The standard theoretical model of the entrepreneurial decision in the economics literature posits that two major opportunity costs to starting a business are wages in the labor market and returns to investing unspent capital (Evans and Jovanovic 1989) . There is also some empirical evidence that opportunity costs are an important factor in the decision to become an entrepreneur (Evans and Leighton 1989) , and that it is often weighed against the expected size of the new venture (Cassar, 2006) or the expected returns (Bhide, 2000) . Furthermore, Evans and Leighton (1989) find that low wages are associated with entry into entrepreneurship, using evidence from the National (Haltiwanger 2004) . 5 There is also direct evidence that access to personal computers increases entrepreneurship (Fairlie 2005) . Personal computers may make it easier for a potential entrepreneur to create an experimental business plan, obtain information about tax codes and legal regulations, conduct research on production techniques and competition, and may be useful to new business owners for accounting, inventory, communications, and advertising.
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On the other hand, earnings in the wage and salary sector were increasing very rapidly during this period (increasing w) placing downward pressure on entrepreneurship. Figure 1 displays average annual earnings in the San Francisco/San Jose/Oakland metropolitan area, California and the United States. In the San Francisco Bay Area, mean earnings rose from $42,000 to more than $58,000, which was far higher than mean earnings in California or the United States. The unemployment rate also dropped rapidly over this period of time (see Figure 2 ). The unemployment rate in the San Francisco Bay Area fell to a remarkable low of 2.2 percent in December 2000. Overall, the late 1990s were a period when the returns to the wage and salary sector were at unprecedented levels.
7
Another factor creating downward pressure on entrepreneurship was the opportunity cost of capital. The returns to investing in the stock market were extremely high during this time period. Figure   3 displays the returns to investing in a few different assets over the 1996 to 2004 period. Investing $10,000 in the NASDAQ in 1995 would have grown to $45,000 from 1996 to 2000, and investing $10,000 in the SP 500 would have grown to nearly $22,000. Of course, investing in a less risky asset 5 Large investments in computer equipment, however, may only occur after the initial stages of business formation. Investments in computers per employee increase rapidly with firm size (Buckley and Montes 2002) , and computer investment as a share of total capital expenditures increases rapidly with firm age, at least through the first five years (Haltiwanger 2004) . 6 Estimates from the Survey of Small Business Finances indicate that the four most common uses of computers in small businesses are for administrative purposes, bookkeeping, email and managing inventory (Bitler 2002) . 7 There is also evidence of high levels of job mobility among hi-tech workers in Silicon Valley suggesting a dynamic labor market (i.e. Fallick, Fleishman and Rebitzer 2006) . On the other hand, high levels of job mobility might also result in a higher chance of starting a business.
would have paid smaller returns, but many investors were placing a lot of money in the stock market at this point in time, and investing this money in a startup meant missing out on those returns.
The booming stock market, however, also increased personal wealth. Valley actually increased as more individuals exploited entrepreneurial opportunities.
Our study makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the extant literature. First, we extend the insights from previous work by investigating the existence and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. We also emphasize the point that increases in the number of entrepreneurial opportunities are often associated with increases in the opportunity cost of exploitation, which complicates the theoretical and empirical relationship between opportunities and entrepreneurial activity. Finally, we introduce and implement a new measure of entrepreneurship which indicates that Silicon Valley, long described as the most important location for entrepreneurship in the world, was not as entrepreneurial during the strong economic growth period of the late 1990s as previously assumed. These novel results, if confirmed in other studies, will have an impact on both academic and popular views of entrepreneurship in the United States.
In the next section, we discuss our data and then proceed to introduce our measure of entrepreneurship, the empirical approach, and results. We conclude with implications for future research and limitations of our data.
Data
Although research on entrepreneurship is growing rapidly, there are very few national datasets individuals from month to month for 75% of all respondents to each survey. To match these data, we use the household and individual identifiers provided by the CPS and remove false matches by comparing race, sex and age codes from the two months. All non-unique matches are also removed from the dataset.
Monthly match rates are generally between 94 and 96 percent, and false positive rates are very low.
Because match rates are so high for month to month matches, self-employment rates and the demographic characteristics of matched individuals do not differ substantially from the original representative CPS sample. There are only slight differences between the matched sample and the full sample with the matched sample generally being slightly younger, less educated and more disadvantaged.
MEASURING ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Potential measures of the number of existing business owners or businesses are readily available from several nationally representative government datasets. For example, the Economic Census: Survey of Business Owners provides estimates of the total number of businesses every 5 years, and the CPS provides estimates of the total number of self-employed business owners every month. 10 Typical measures of business ownership based on these data, however, do not capture the dynamic nature that is generally implied when defining entrepreneurship. In particular, they do not measure business formation at the time the business is created.
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To estimate the entrepreneurship rate, we first identify all individuals who do not own a business as their main job in the first survey month. By matching CPS files, we then identify whether they own a business as their main job with 15 or more usual hours worked in the following survey month. The entrepreneurship rate is thus defined as the percentage of the population of non-business owners that start a business each month. 12 To identify whether they are business owners in each month we use information on their main job defined as the one with the most hours worked. Thus, individuals who start side or casual businesses will not be counted if they are working more hours on a wage and salary job. The 15 or more hours restriction also rules out the possibility of business ownership as "disguised unemployment" (Carter and Sutch 1994 (Davis, et. al. 2006 ). Estimates of business formation from the CPS do not suffer from this problem because they include all new employer and non-employer firms.
One difference between estimates of business creation in the CPS and those from business-level sources is caused by the difference between business owners and businesses. In other words, we do not expect the total number of business owners and the total number of businesses to be perfectly comparable at a point in time so the rate of creation could also differ. Multiple businesses owned by one individual count only once in individual-level data and businesses with multiple owners count only once in businesslevel data. These discrepancies are relatively minor, however. Estimates from the 1992 CBO indicate that the total number of business owners is only 12 percent larger than the total number of businesses (U.S.
Census Bureau 1997). Similarly, Boden and Nucci (1997) find that less than 3 percent of small business records in the CBO pertain to owners of multiple businesses. Hi-tech industries represent 23 percent of the workforce in Silicon Valley, which is more than double the percentage for the rest of the United States. As expected, we also find that workers in these industries are also very educated. Nearly 50 percent of workers in these industries have at least a 4-year college degree. For all other industries, only 27 percent of workers have at least a 4-year college degree.
Entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley
As noted above, there is no evidence in the previous literature from a large, nationally representative dataset on patterns of entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley. Figure 6 and Table 1 Another interesting pattern that emerges from the data is that Silicon Valley has a higher entrepreneurship rate in the 6 year period after the peak of the NASDAQ than during the economic boom of the late 1990s.
The entrepreneurship rate increased from 0.39 percent to 0.41 percent. 16 The U.S. rate also increased, but only slightly between the two periods. These findings are inconsistent with the common perception that the late 1990s were a period of unbridled entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley. The high returns to wage and salary work in Silicon Valley may have dampened the number of individuals creating new businesses. Following the trend for hi-tech entrepreneurship, total business creation rates increased in Silicon Valley from the pre-to post-boom periods. These trends resulted in total entrepreneurship rates that were higher in Silicon Valley than in the United States in the post-boom period. Similar to the findings for hi-tech industries, however, we do not find evidence that total entrepreneurship rates were substantially higher in Silicon Valley than elsewhere during the economic boom of the late 1990s. Overall business creation was only slightly higher during this period and increased substantially above the national rate only in the postboom period. We return to focusing on hi-tech industries. Estimates from the CPS may reveal different regional patterns because they focus on hi-tech industries and include all hi-tech business starts with and without employees. The inclusion of non-employer startups in the CPS may be especially important for hi-tech industries.
Entrepreneurship in the Late 1990s
To focus on the late 1990s and hi-tech industries, entrepreneurship rates are estimated for the largest MSAs in the United States by combining data from January 1996 to February 2000. Table 2 reports estimates for the 20 largest MSAs for this period. status, and home ownership on the probability of entrepreneurship are examined. The inclusion of these variables controls for geographical differences in demographic and employment characteristics and changes over time in these characteristics. Although estimates of entrepreneurship rates have been created from the CPS, the determinants of entrepreneurship at the micro level have not been explored using the underlying data. Furthermore, a large literature explores the regional characteristics associated with firm formation, but these studies do not have information on the characteristics of individual business owners and focus on employer firm formation. Individual-level analyses using microdata improve on MSA-level analyses because they control directly for individual differences and implicitly for the main metropolitan area differences in detailed demographic and employment characteristics. In other words, the use of microdata accounts for MSA-level variation in the same measures. has a larger concentration of immigrants, which places downward pressure on hi-tech entrepreneurship rates, the highly educated workforce, which is associated with higher rates of hi-tech entrepreneurship, and other factors more than offset the effect. The result is that entrepreneurship rates continue to be lower in Silicon Valley than the United States during the late 1990s.
ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES
We check the sensitivity of results to several additional specifications and samples. One concern is that we are comparing Silicon Valley partly to rural areas in the rest of the United States, which might not be appropriate. As a robustness check, we exclude individuals living in rural areas from the sample.
The determinants of entrepreneurship in rural areas may also differ from the determinants in more urban areas. Specification 4 of Table 4 reports estimates. The coefficients are not sensitive to the exclusion of these observations, which represent 11.8 percent of the full sample of hi-tech workers. The exclusion of individuals living in rural areas from the regressions results in a slightly smaller coefficient on the Silicon
Valley dummy variable (0.0032). The coefficients, however, remain large, negative and statistically significant indicating lower rates of entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley than the U.S. total. Thus, the estimates for the comparison to the rest of the United States are not sensitive to the inclusion of rural areas.
Although not reported, we also check the sensitivity of results to larger metropolitan areas.
Excluding small metropolitan areas, we find a coefficient estimate of -0.000746, which is similar to what we find using the full sample (reported in Specification 1). The coefficient remains positive and statistically significant. We also check the sensitivity to hours worked. Restricting entrepreneurship to individuals with at least 30 hours worked per week, we also find similar results for the Silicon Valley coefficient. Finally, we estimate the regressions using a logit model and a linear probability model and find similar marginal effect estimates. Overall, the reported estimates are not sensitive to alternative specifications, samples and estimation techniques. Table 1 ). This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that large opportunity costs in terms of a very tight labor market in Silicon
Entrepreneurship in Silicon
Valley in the late 1990s may have suppressed entrepreneurship during this period. As the labor market worsened after March 2000 in Silicon Valley, we would expect to see entrepreneurship rates rise. The change in labor market conditions was also much more pronounced in Silicon Valley than the rest of the United States, which is consistent with the finding that entrepreneurship rates increased by less in the United States from the pre-to post-boom periods.
This comparison between the pre-and post-boom periods is useful for testing our hypothesis regarding the importance of opportunity costs in determining entrepreneurship rates. The comparison of pre to post periods implicitly controls for all of the factors that are unique to Silicon Valley, such as the extreme concentration of established hi-tech firms, the presence of several leading universities and research institutes, and the distinct social networks among entrepreneurs. The major change in the post boom period was a decline in the local economy, resulting in a substantial drop in the opportunity costs of starting a business. Thus, an increase in entrepreneurship rates in Silicon Valley from the pre to post periods provides further evidence that entrepreneurship rates were suppressed in Silicon Valley during the "Roaring 90s" due to an exceptionally tight labor market.
To explore this question more carefully, however, we need to confirm that the increase in entrepreneurship in Silicon Valley between the two time periods was not due to changes in demographic characteristics. We estimate probit regressions that include the full sample of observations from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 2005 and interactions with time periods (see Table 5 ). Specification 1 includes the basic set of controls for demographic characteristics. Entrepreneurship increased in Silicon
Valley from the boom period to the post-boom period relative to changes in the national rate of entrepreneurship. The entrepreneurship rate in Silicon Valley increased by 0.024 percentage points after controlling for demographic characteristics and changes in the U.S. entrepreneurship rate. This estimated change is identical to the actual change in the entrepreneurship rate of 0.024 percentage points.
Specification 2 reports estimates from a sample for only Silicon Valley. In this specification, the rest of the U.S. is not used as the comparison group. We are simply comparing entrepreneurship rates in Silicon Valley in the post to the pre periods after controlling for changes in demographic characteristics.
The estimated change in entrepreneurship rates is positive and larger than the previous estimates. Thus, removing the implicit controls for the slight upward trend in the U.S. rate results in a larger increase in entrepreneurship rates in the post-boom period in Silicon Valley. We return to including the rest of the United States to control for changes in the macro-economy over this period.
The estimates reported in Table 1 The entrepreneurship rate in Silicon Valley increased by 0.02 percentage points from the late 1990s to the post-boom period. This is an interesting new finding. Entrepreneurship was higher after the dot com bust than in the late 1990s in Silicon Valley. But, even after controlling for demographic and employment characteristics Silicon Valley continued to have lower entrepreneurship rates than the United States. 20 The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of rural or small metropolitan areas.
The substantial returns to the labor market in Silicon Valley may have depressed business creation, especially during the strong economic growth period of the late 1990s.
Implications for Theory and Practice
Besides our provocative empirical findings, our work provides several useful insights for the academic literature on entrepreneurship. First, our results suggest that in a strong economy, the number of entrepreneurial opportunities could indeed increase without commensurate increases in actual entrepreneurship. This result is driven by higher opportunity costs to entrepreneurship that dissuade some individuals from leaving salaried labor. Future theoretical research in management should thus consider the role of opportunity costs in the entrepreneurial decision. Future empirical research in economics and management should investigate the measures and results in this paper more closely and in different contexts.
Our work also has implications for public policy. Many cities in the United States and around the world are trying to emulate the Silicon Valley experience. The findings from this analysis indicate that, at least in terms of potentially creating high rates of entrepreneurship, the demographic characteristics of the population and economic conditions are important. In particular, having a large concentration of immigrants and a highly-educated workforce are likely to lead to more entrepreneurial activity. But, there is another component to Silicon Valley that is more difficult to measure --the entire environment or
"habitat" appears to be favorable for innovation and entrepreneurship . A highly educated and mobile workforce, a risk taking and failure tolerant culture, open business environment, location of top universities and research institutes, extensive support services, quality of life, and other characteristics of the area appear to contribute to the success of Silicon Valley .
Likewise, other work has posited that new venture creation is more common in "clusters" colocated with valuable resources (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003) . Stuart and Sorenson (2003) argue that "the local nature of social capital suggests that new ventures will more likely begin in regions that offer ample supplies of the necessary resources." Since incipient entrepreneurs require social connections with potential resource providers, and resources are geographically concentrated, some areas are predicted to have higher founding rates than others (Sorenson and Audia, 2000) .
However, these sociological drivers of clustering are difficult to separate from the economic spillovers that result from agglomeration (Krugman, 1991) . Industry agglomeration can also lead to the related phenomenon of entrepreneurial spawning (Gompers, Lerner, and Sharfstein, 2005; Chatterji, 2008) , where former employees of incumbent firms start new ventures in the same industry. Employees gain valuable knowledge working at the parent firm, related to specific technologies and markets, which enable them to identify new entrepreneurial opportunities. These spawned ventures are often located near the original parent firm, adding to the agglomeration effects discussed above.
Future research should examine these regional dimensions of entrepreneurship further, utilizing different datasets and empirical approaches. Our paper provides some empirical evidence that regional differences in entrepreneurship can be driven by the interplay between opportunities and opportunity costs in particular areas. However, the crucial role of social capital and agglomeration economies is difficult to measure in our data, leaving many opportunities for future work. Hi-Tech Entrepreneurship, CPS (1996 Notes: (1) The sample consists of individuals in hi-tech industries (ages 20-64) who do not own a business in the first survey month. (2) Additional controls include month, year, and urban status dummies.
